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Every consumer deserves an equal 
opportunity to access  the credit  
market, and that credit should never 
be withheld because of sex or any 
other factor not related to ability and 
willingness to repay the loan.1
Decades ago, lenders could refuse to provide credit to qualified borrowers based solely on arbitrary characteristics such as race, religion, or sex.2Moreover, when faced with equally creditworthy 
loan applicants, lenders would charge certain borrowers higher 
loan rates for no legitimate reason.3  Congress passed the Equal 
Credit Opportunity Act (“ECOA”) 4 to forbid arbitrary discrimi-
nation.5  But, did the ECOA fully protect consumers from facing 
discrimination on the basis of arbitrary characteristics?6
At the same time that Congress outlawed discrimination in 
“any aspect” of a credit transaction on a prohibited basis, it spe-
cifically allowed “affirmative” discrimination on these same 
grounds.  Any such affirmative action credit program is called a 
“Special Purpose Credit Program” (“SPCP”)7, known as the 
consumer credit equivalent to affirmative action hiring plans.8
For instance, a disadvantaged Black applicant could legally be 
turned down because of the color of her skin if she applied for 
an SPCP designed for Native Americans.9  Both large and small 
lenders currently offer SPCP programs that make credit avail-
able on preferential terms to certain groups.10
This article will not take a position on whether affirmative 
action is constitutional or whether it is beneficial for society.  
Rather, this article will argue that SPCPs are limited by equal 
protection principles external to the ECOA.  This question is 
timely because “affirmative action” and equal protection law 
have evolved in the 30 years since the ECOA and its SPCP pro-
vision was first passed.  At least one law firm recently advised 
its clients to be mindful of a challenge to the SPCP under civil 
rights principles, in part, as a result of some of these changes.11
While the Federal Reserve Board is required to regularly review 
and, if necessary, update the ECOA,12 the SPCP section has re-
ceived only perfunctory changes.13  The Federal Reserve Board 
is unlikely to mandate changes that negate the letter of the law 
in any regulation, including the ECOA, as the Board’s role is 
primarily to write regulations that implement the laws passed by 
Congress.14
This article is intended to fill a necessary void and analyze 
SPCPs in light of three decades of legal developments.15  Part I 
will provide a brief history of applicable constitutional and civil 
rights law, including the ECOA, to help the reader understand 
the context for SPCPs, and introduce the reader to SPCP pro-
grams.  Part II will propose a multi-step analysis and argue that 
SPCPs are illegal under the equal protection clause.  Part III will 
propose two amendments to the ECOA to ensure that SPCPs are 
available to satisfy special social needs without discriminating 
against any protected class.  Finally, Part IV concludes in sup-
port of fair lending enforcement to advance public policy inter-
ests.
BACKGROUND-THE EXISTING LAW
A. IMPORTANT CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES
   1. EQUAL PROTECTION
The Equal Protection (“E.P.”) clause16 has evolved substan-
tially during the twenty-first century, as it is considered to be a 
“viable [and] powerful” strategy to challenge inequality.17  Sim-
ply put, the E.P. clause prohibits purposeful18 or “invidious dis-
crimination.”19  Considering that certain classes or groups may 
benefit more than others from virtually any government action,20
the courts apply one of three tests to assess the constitutionality 
of a challenged behavior.21  An E.P. analysis is essentially iden-
tical under both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,22 as the 
primary difference is the level of government at issue.23  How-
ever, the actor need not be a state or federal entity.  Private con-
duct is considered to be state action in several circumstances, 
including conduct authorized by the state, which is significant 
for this article.  Unfortunately, the Court does not have a precise 
test for state-authorized conduct, as it makes a determination 
after weighing the facts in each case.24
2. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION LAW
An affirmative action program is designed to “change the 
outward and visible signs of yesterday’s racial distinctions and 
thus, to provide an impetus to the process of dismantling the 
barriers, psychological or otherwise, erected by past practices.”25
The constitutionality of affirmative action programs is evaluated 
under the equal protection clause because the equal protection 
clause “protect[s] persons, not groups.”26  Tracing their origins 
to New Deal-era labor laws,27 affirmative action programs 
started in the employment context and later expanded to college 
admissions.28  Affirmative action is largely court-defined, as it is 
not expressly authorized in what is considered its statutory gene-
sis, the Civil Rights Act of 1964.29  One source of controversy is 
whether the Supreme Court abrogated this “unambiguously co-
lorblind” statute through its decisions to allow affirmative action 
programs,30  or whether its legislative history allows considera-
tion of race “in order to alleviate the historic problem of racial 




Affirmative action law has undergone substantial change in 
the forty years since its inception.  Most affirmative action cases 
are traceable to Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,
which allowed a public university to consider race as a factor in 
its admissions process.32   The Court recently upheld the funda-
mental holding of Bakke, holding that it was legal to consider 
race as one of many factors,33 yet illegal to automatically favor 
an applicant based on race.34  Nonetheless, the Court will use 
strict scrutiny to determine whether governmental race-based 
affirmative action programs are narrowly tailored to the compel-
ling government interest.35
The preceding discussion applies only to affirmative action 
plans by governmental entities. The Supreme Court has noted 
that affirmative action programs by private actors do not trigger 
equal protection clause scrutiny.36  Thus, the affirmative action 
principles delineated above will apply only to SPCPs that are 
operated, either directly or indirectly, by the government.  Truly 
private SPCPs need not satisfy these rules.  This section summa-
rized the underlying law pertaining to the affirmative action-like 
component of SPCPs which permit otherwise illegal discrimina-
tion.  The next section introduces these anti-discrimination laws. 
B. ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW IN LENDING
While the Civil Rights Act (“CRA”) of 1968 generally pro-
hibited discrimination by private actors in housing-related trans-
actions,37 it neither “proscribed” lending discrimination, nor 
established a comprehensive enforcement scheme.38  Thus, the 
CRA was inadequate to protect creditworthy individuals against 
credit discrimination on “often irrational” grounds.39
The ECOA was passed in 1974 to protect consumers on the 
basis of sex and marital status in response to reports of credit 
practices that ran contrary to the spirit of equality for all.40  For 
instance, the ECOA was initially called a “Women’s Law” 41
because creditworthy females often had been unable to obtain 
credit in their own names.42  Congress enhanced and expanded 
the ECOA two years later in 1976.43  The ECOA prohibits a 
lender from discriminating in “any aspect” of a credit transac-
tion on the basis of sex, marital status, race, color, religion, na-
tional origin, age, receipt of public assistance income, or exer-
cising certain consumer rights in good faith.44  The ECOA pro-
tects a consumer in all stages of the credit process from the 
lender’s conduct before it receives an application, the decision 
whether to approve the application and on what terms, to the 
treatment of the consumer once becoming a customer.45
1. OVERVIEW OF SPCPS
The SPCP was added to the ECOA in 1976.  The three 
types of SPCPs include: those authorized by law for the benefit 
of an economically disadvantaged class;46 those offered by a 
non-profit corporation for its members or an economically dis-
advantaged class;47 and those offered by a for-profit organiza-
tion to meet special needs.48  To qualify, the targeted group need 
not prove historical disadvantage or disparate treatment.49
Credit unions, as not-for-profit institutions,50 fall into the 
second category.  Thus, while banks and for-profit lenders must 
satisfy legal formalities before establishing an SPCP, a credit 
union can create an SPCP without a formal plan for any group 
or for any reason.51  Credit unions requested and received this 
special treatment compared to other lenders because they feared 
violating the ECOA by restricting lending to their members.52
Simply put, Congress wanted to permit “church-affiliated credit 
unions” to only serve their members.53  Thus, Congress sought 
to protect credit unions using the SPCP provision. 
SPCPs are intended to help economically disadvantaged 
individuals or meet special social needs.  It is possible that the 
SPCP provision was partially motivated by a federal commis-
sion report54 that recommended low-income individuals receive 
credit on competitive terms, and presented case studies on pro-
grams that help the disadvantaged.  Regardless, Congress had in 
mind programs based on the applicant’s age when creating the 
SPCP for for-profit organizations,55 as Congress did not intend 
to prohibit positive credit programs aimed at “young adults.”56
SPCPs are clearly not limited to certain age groups, as the three 
examples provided in Regulation B for SPCP programs targeted 
to a specific audience are “race, national origin, or sex.”57
The SPCP allows creditors to engage in conduct that would 
otherwise be discriminatory.58  A lender may require all partici-
pants in a SPCP to share a “common characteristic,” such as 
age, while barring from the program those who do not meet this 
characteristic.59  A creditor does not have free reign, though.  As 
a lender, the creditor is still subject to all other provisions of the 
ECOA and cannot discriminate other than by requiring this com-
mon characteristic.  SPCPs also cannot be structured to evade 
the requirements of the ECOA.  It is unlikely that a SPCP can be 
used for any residential real estate-related loan program because 
the Fair Housing Act does not include a SPCP exception.60
2. SPCPS IN PRACTICE
Just as Congress intended,61 a SPCP may overtly discrimi-
nate against specific protected classes or disparately treat62 cer-
tain groups.  The Federal Reserve Board63 acknowledged this 
when it found that a New York State law that prevented a SPCP 
from being established on the basis of “race, creed, color, na-
tional origin, sex, or marital status” was preempted by the 
ECOA.64  The Federal Reserve Board evidently realized that 
Congress intended to allow SPCPs to discriminate.  Further-
more, while not dispositive of the issue, the United States De-
partment of Justice (“DOJ”) has stated in court filings that a 
SPCP may be based on race, assuming the program meets all the 
other legal requirements.65
The Federal Reserve Board proposed to clarify the regula-
tion to indicate that a SPCP “should not have the effect of de-
priving people who are not part of the class of rights or opportu-
nities they otherwise would have.”66  Regardless, federal bank 
examiners are instructed to encourage banks offering SPCPs 
based on a protected class to rename and restructure the program 
based on factors “not prohibited by the ECOA,” such as “first-
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time home buyer.”67
Indeed, the SPCP is used in a discriminatory manner.  For 
instance, the Virginia Housing Development Authority 
(“VHDA”) precluded unmarried couples from participating in a 
preferential loan program by requiring that the applicants be 
related by “blood or marriage.”68  A federal court dismissed an 
ECOA claim for marital status discrimination on which the 
plaintiff would “plainly prevail”69 because the VHDA program 
was a SPCP authorized by state law.  Additionally, Mobil Oil 
and the former OmniBank offered a SPCP that allowed female 
or minority borrowers preferential treatment in the lending proc-
ess when seeking a loan.70  Credit unions offer preferential 
credit programs targeted to an age group under 62.71  While it is 
unknown how many SPCP programs are in existence, the fed-
eral Office of Thrift Supervision (“OTS”)72 issued a guidance 
letter to the lenders it regulates in response to SPCP inquiries 
from thrifts.73
THE SPECIAL PURPOSE EXCEPTION IS LIMITED IN
SCOPE
A. BASIC OVERVIEW AND ANALYSIS
SPCP programs face limitations not inherent in the ECOA.  
SPCPs may violate equal protection concepts or exceed the 
scope of the ECOA law.  Based on an equal protection analysis, 
I offer here a multi-step test to gauge their legality.74
The first step is to determine whether the SPCP discrimi-
nates against a protected class.  The eligibility requirements for 
a SPCP may be based on either neutral factors or on the appli-
cant’s membership in a protected class.  An example of the for-
mer is a program that offers any first-time, low-income home-
buyer with a credit on closing costs.  An example of the latter is 
a program that offers any person under 25 years of age with a 
preferred rate on an installment loan.  Both program structures 
are now legal under the ECOA.  However, it is clear that only 
programs in the first category should be presumed legal.  The 
analysis for the first category of programs will end for purposes 
of this article, although these programs would be illegal if they 
violate the disparate treatment rules of the ECOA.75  By con-
trast, programs in the second category should be suspect owing 
to their use of a prohibited class, and hence proceed to the next 
step of the analysis. 
The next step of analysis is to identify the type of discrimi-
nation.76  Discrimination can occur during either the underwrit-
ing process (when the lender decides whether to approve the 
loan request), or after approval when the terms and conditions
(such as rates) are set.  For instance, a program that enables 
those under age 25 to receive a credit card regardless of their 
credit history is an example of a lender discriminating during the 
underwriting process, while a program offering a loan rate dis-
count only to women would be an example of discrimination 
through terms and conditions. 
From there, the analysis splits depending on the type of 
discrimination involved.  Any program that offers terms and 
conditions that are preferential compared to ordinary borrowers 
is illegal, as SPCPs are not empowered to discriminate in this 
matter.77  For any program that discriminates in the underwriting 
process, the analysis hinges on whether the SPCP is operated by 
a public or private entity.  If the SPCP is purely private, the 
lender discrimination is authorized because the program falls 
under the SPCP exception to the normal anti-discrimination 
rules of ECOA.  Equal protection principles would not regulate 
the private actor’s conduct.  If the SPCP is public or governmen-
tal, the proper level of scrutiny to evaluate the SPCP is deter-
mined based on the protected class at issue.  This article argues 
that all SPCPs, even those offered by private lenders, must be 
analyzed in this way.
The 5th Amendment and 14th Amendment generally provide 
no protection against discrimination committed by private ac-
tors.78 Thus, an equal protection claim against a private entity 
for a discriminatory program will fail if the lender is not (either 
directly or indirectly) a state actor.79
However, the Constitution prohibits discrimination by a 
private entity when there is a “sufficiently close nexus” between 
the government and the lender’s questionable practice.80 The 
government must provide sufficient encouragement, “either 
overt or covert,” to make it responsible for the practice.81  In the 
words of Judge Friendly, “the state must be involved not simply 
with some activity...alleged to have inflicted injury upon a plain-
tiff but with the activity that caused the injury...the state action, 
not the private action, must be the subject of complaint.”82 For 
example, governmental authorization does not exist when a stat-
ute governs deregulated, traditional business conduct,83 yet does 
when the law creates a climate in which private parties may 
choose to discriminate.84
SPCPs easily fit the second category as the SPCP creates an 
exception that permits discrimination that would otherwise be 
illegal; it is essentially a “statutory invitation to private actors to 
discriminate.”85  In other words, lenders would be unable to 
practice illegal discrimination but for the government’s SPCP 
exception. This is clearly an invitation to discriminate; the gov-
ernment is the root cause of the private actor’s discrimination. 
One commentator has noted that the Supreme Court will find 
invitations to discrimination to be state action, as enticing dis-
crimination is different from allowing the free market to inde-
pendently develop.86 Consequently, all SPCPs must be analyzed 
as state-administered programs. 
B. WHY STATE ADMINISTERED SPCPS FAIL EQUAL
PROTECTION ANALYSIS
This section will analyze SPCPs that are expressly state 
authorized or considered state actions.87  In reality, though, this 
discussion applies to all SPCP programs since, as shown earlier, 
all SPCP programs are government authorized.  To recap, the 
alleged state interest in allowing governmental entities and non-
profits to create SPCPs is to help an “economically disadvan-
taged class of persons,” for credit unions to serve their members, 
and allow private entities to meet “special social needs.”88
A court performs the Equal Protection Clause analysis using 
the appropriate level of scrutiny.  The court will use an interme-
diate scrutiny test for sex, strict scrutiny for race, color, religion, 
and national origin, and rational basis scrutiny for marital status, 
age, receipt of public assistance income, or exercising certain 
consumer rights in good faith. 
1. ANALYSIS UNDER STRICT SCRUTINY: RACE, COLOR, RE-
LIGION  & NATIONAL ORIGIN
Affirmative action programs based on race or national ori-
gin must use a strict scrutiny, or narrowly tailored, least dis-
criminatory89 means to meet a compelling state interest.90  Any 
SPCP based on classifications that are subject to strict scrutiny 
(race, color, religion, and national origin) fails this test. 
The Supreme Court has held that any person has “the right 
to demand that any governmental actor subject to the Constitu-
tion justify any racial classification subjecting that person to 
unequal treatment under the strictest judicial scrutiny,” and that 
“benign” discrimination cannot be held to a lower standard of 
scrutiny.91  The Court later went a step further, and struck down 
a university admissions program that automatically favored ap-
plicants on the basis of race.92  The Court applies strict scrutiny 
to suspect programs based on color, religion, or national origin. 
Regarding SPCPs, the Fifth Circuit found an analogous 
federal program unconstitutional.  In Moore v. USDA, the plain-
tiff was denied financing from a USDA program designed to 
help “socially disadvantaged groups” due to his race, as the noti-
fication letter stated, in part, “No Whites.”93  Although his Fifth 
Amendment equal protection claim failed for seeking monetary 
damages and not equitable relief, the plaintiff succeeded in his 
ECOA claim.94
A SPCP is not the least discriminatory means to accomplish 
Congress’s stated goal or to serve its intended purpose.  For in-
stance, consider the situation of an immigrant from an impover-
ished Eastern European nation who owns a small business in an 
impoverished community, yet would be precluded, simply be-
cause of skin color, from participating in a major bank’s SPCP 
offering preferential underwriting standards.95  The stated goal 
of helping the economically disadvantaged is clearly not served 
when a business is unable to receive special financing terms 
because of the owner’s race or national origin.  Consequently, 
any SPCP that is structured based on a particular class of indi-
viduals benefits solely that class and excludes similarly situated 
individuals in other classes. 
Likewise, it would clearly be more effective to offer credit 
under a streamlined program to any individual without a credit 
history, rather than only to those who share an arbitrary or im-
mutable characteristic (such as age).  In other words, a program 
structured around neutral factors, such as economic need, would 
be the most beneficial to society and most effectively fulfill 
Congress’ stated goals.96  Perhaps this is why President Clinton 
shifted the focus of affirmative action policy solely from mem-
bership in a protected class to residence in an economically dis-
tressed area as defined by poverty and unemployment data.97
Consequently, the least burdensome means test is not satisfied 
by SPCPs. 
Additionally, Congress could have clarified that a credit 
union may only lend to its members without creating a much 
broader exception that favors credit unions over banks with re-
spect to the ECOA.98  Therefore, these SPCPs are not narrowly 
tailored (nor the least discriminatory means) to meet Congress’ 
goals of helping economically disadvantaged individuals, pro-
tecting credit unions, or meeting special social needs.99  Disad-
vantaged individuals and credit union members will receive the 
same credit opportunities when a SPCP is structured on a neutral 
basis.
2. ANALYSIS UNDER INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY: GENDER
Gender discrimination is evaluated using intermediate scru-
tiny, although recent cases indicate that it is an elevated level of 
intermediate scrutiny review.100  A program that discriminates 
on the basis of gender violates the equal protection clause, 
unless it serves an important governmental interest101 and has an 
exceedingly persuasive justification.102  For instance, it was ille-
gal to grant alimony in a divorce to the wife only, as the Court 
held that it was not appropriate to use gender as a proxy for need 
or assume the male was the primary breadwinner.103  Interest-
ingly, gender-based affirmative action programs are less likely 
to be invalidated than race-based programs.104
Nonetheless, the outcome of SPCPs using intermediate 
scrutiny is the same as with strict scrutiny earlier.  Specifically, 
courts will review the stated purpose of any affirmative action 
program to ensure its legality.105  As one court stated, “when 
government undertakes affirmative action, it must present a 
‘strong basis in evidence’ for doing so.”106
Here, Congress failed to adequately support its decision to 
implement this affirmative action program to discriminate based 
on a protected class.  The House hearings do not discuss the 
SPCP provision, except for testimony by an industry representa-
tive who sought an exemption from the ECOA for “negative 
discrimination that results in the denial of credit” or “reverse 
discrimination” programs.107  The House hearings included testi-
mony on “affirmative approaches” by lenders, which were tar-
geted to underserved, inner-city areas as much as they were de-
signed to help “minority businessmen.”108  The Senate hearings, 
interestingly, refer to the House hearings as being the justifica-
tion for the SPCP exception.109  Therefore, SPCPs based on gen-
der must fail because Congress failed to provide the requisite 
strong justification. 
3. ANALYSIS UNDER RATIONAL BASIS SCRUTINY: MARITAL
STATUS, AGE, RECEIPT OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE INCOME, OR
GOOD FAITH  EXERCISE OF CERTAIN CONSUMER RIGHTS
It is possible some SPCPs could be based on a protected 
category within the ECOA, yet be subject only to rational basis 
constitutional scrutiny.110  For example, a program could offer a 
credit card to customers between ages 18 and 25 without regard 
for the applicant’s length of credit experience. This program is 
discriminatory against older borrowers who do not have credit 
histories, as these older borrowers are, at a minimum, not en-
couraged to apply, and would be subject to the normal under-
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writing criteria that would preclude them from obtaining credit. 
It is likely that a SPCP based on any category reviewed 
using rational basis scrutiny would satisfy an equal protection 
analysis.  Under rational basis scrutiny, a law is upheld assum-
ing its means are, at least remotely, related to a health, safety, or 
moral concern of government, even if there is a less discrimina-
tory policy available.111  Additionally, courts will give particular 
deference to the legislature on social and economic legisla-
tion.112  In short, courts give broad deference to the government 
when conducting a review using the rational basis standard.113
Thus, a SPCP structured on any of these criteria would meet 
constitutional scrutiny. 
A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM
Since SPCPs are presumably illegal under equal protection 
analysis in light of the information presented above, the ECOA 
must be amended.  This is because a SPCP should never be 
based on a protected class, and credit unions should be held to 
the same standards as banks under the ECOA.  Two amend-
ments are proposed below. 
First, the ECOA should be amended to prevent membership 
in a protected class from being a prerequisite for participation in 
a SPCP.  This may be accomplished by adding a provision to § 
1691(c) that states, “A credit assistance or special purpose credit 
program may not base its eligibility guidelines upon whether a 
person is a member of a class of persons defined in § 1691(a).”  
This amendment would preserve Congress’s intent to enhance 
the credit opportunities available to the disadvantaged, yet 
would protect a person from discrimination based on immutable 
characteristics such as race or sex.  The change would also en-
sure that SPCPs are subject to relaxed judicial scrutiny.114
For instance, a hypothetical SPCP designed to help those 
without established credit histories should not be limited to only 
those under age 25, as older individuals may not have credit 
histories due to legitimate reasons such as being a recent immi-
grant to the United States or heritage from a culture that shuns 
traditional financial service providers.  A hypothetical program 
based on class helps borrowers solely of a specific class who 
have a credit problem, and not those in other classes with the 
same credit problem.  If the fair lending laws are relevant, a 
lender should not be given the flexibility to discriminate when a 
viable alternative is available to prevent discrimination. 
Second, credit union issues require another amendment to 
the ECOA.  As described earlier, credit unions are broadly 
granted more flexibility than banks to use SPCPs to discrimi-
nate.  However, this is not the only way that credit unions re-
ceive favorable treatment under the ECOA.  The National Credit 
Union Administration (“NCUA”) enforces federal credit unions’ 
compliance with the ECOA.115  The NCUA must refer to the 
DOJ all patterns or practices of ECOA violations that involve 
either illegal discrimination in “any aspect”116 of a credit trans-
action or the improper discouragement or denial of applica-
tions.117  The DOJ provides Congress with an annual report 
summarizing the ECOA referrals it receives from the federal 
regulatory agencies.118  These reports indicate that the NCUA 
has made no referrals to DOJ, while the four bank regulatory 
agencies have referred dozens of substantive ECOA violations 
to DOJ.  For instance, a General Accounting Office Report 
showed that the NCUA made none of the 53 referrals between 
1990 and 1995,119 and none of the 140 cases sent to DOJ be-
tween 1999-2004.120
On the one hand, the fact that the NCUA referred no ECOA 
matters to DOJ could be an excellent sign because it suggests 
that credit unions are in compliance with the fair lending laws.  
Granted, credit unions are often smaller and less complex than 
many banks, thereby indicating less fair lending risk.121  A for-
mer NCUA administrator even testified before Congress that 
credit unions are “different” from other lenders because they “do 
not deal with the general public” but rather those affiliated 
through a common bond.122  Alternatively, it could indicate ei-
ther that the NCUA is not making referrals to DOJ when re-
quired, or the Interagency Fair Lending Procedures are not being 
properly implemented during examinations of federal credit un-
ions. 
Unfortunately, based on the author’s review of credit union 
websites in April of 2005, it appears that the second scenario 
may be true.123  Congress intended the mandatory referral provi-
sion of the ECOA to be an “enforcement mechanism” when 
adding it to the ECOA in 1991.124  Credit unions already receive 
preferred treatment compared to banks in other areas.125 Con-
gress did not intend for the NCUA to put a low priority on the 
ECOA.126  This is particularly important as credit unions are 
becoming more analogous to banks by getting larger, more com-
plex, and merging together. 
Therefore, §1691 (c)(2) should be amended to clarify that 
credit unions can lend to their members without violating the 
ECOA, but may not otherwise receive less scrutiny than banks 
when establishing a SPCP.  The change can be accomplished by 
revising §202.8(a)(2) to read, “It is not a violation of this section 
for a nonprofit organization to extend credit only to its members.  
A nonprofit organization may also create a special purpose pro-
gram to meet special social needs pursuant to the standards pre-
scribed in regulations by the Board.” 
It is essential that the extra discretion given to credit union-
run SPCPs be eliminated and their rules mirror those for private 
lenders.   As mentioned earlier, Congress intended this provision 
simply to protect credit unions from ECOA challenges.  Amend-
ing this provision will allow Congress to clarify that credit un-
ions may not use a credit assistance program to discriminate 
without first meeting the same requirements as a bank.  After all, 
it does not matter to a consumer whether she is discriminated 
against by a SPCP operated by a bank or a credit assistance pro-
gram operated by a credit union.  These proposed changes to the 
ECOA will ensure that every creditworthy consumer has equal 
access to credit regardless of immutable or arbitrary characteris-
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